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UNITED STATES DISTICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------------X
BOARDING SCHOOL REVIEW, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.

11 Civ. 8921 (DAB)
MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DELTA CAREER EDUCATION CORPORATION,
WESTON EDUCATIONAL, INC., BERKS
TECHNICAL INSTITUTE, INC., MCCANN
EDUCATIONAL CENTERS, INC., MILLER-MOTTE
BUSINESS COLLEGE, INC., SOUTHWEST
BUSINESS COLLEGES, INC., and THE MIAMIJACOBS BUSINESS COLLEGE CO.
Defendants.
-------------------------------------------X
DELTA CAREER EDUCATION CORPORATION, et al.
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,
v.
BOARDING SCHOOL REVIEW, LLC,
Counterclaim-Defendant.
------------------------------------------X
DEBORAH A. BATTS, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant moves this Court pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss Defendants/CounterclaimPlaintiffs’ counterclaims, which allege trademark infringement,
unfair competition, deceptive trade practices, trademark
dilution, and copyright infringement.
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As set forth herein, Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED as to Defendants’ trademark infringement, unfair
competition, deceptive trade practices, and trademark dilution
counterclaims. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss as
to Defendants’ copyright infringement counterclaims for
statutory damages and attorney’s fees but DENIES the Motion as
to Defendants’ copyright infringement counterclaims seeking
other relief.

I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the Counterclaims,
documents attached thereto as exhibits or incorporated by
reference, and websites of which the Court takes judicial
notice. 1 They are taken to be true for the purposes of this

1

Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of five
websites: the Miller-Motte College website home page, the
Heritage website home page, the BSR webpages for Miller-Motte
College – Cary and Heritage College – Oklahoma City, and a
Google support page. (See Def. Req. for Judicial Notice.) The
Court generally has the discretion to take judicial notice of
internet material. Magnoni v. Smith & Laquercia, LLP, 701 F.
Supp. 2d 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Patsy's Italian
Restaurant, Inc. v. Banas, 575 F. Supp. 2d 427, 443 n.18
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“It is generally proper to take judicial notice
of articles and Web sites published on the Internet.”), aff’d,
658 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2011). In addition, the authenticity of
the websites and the printouts of the websites which Defendants
attach to their Request have not been challenged, and they are
“not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. Rule Evidence 201(b).
2
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Memorandum and Order. Plaintiff / Counterclaim-Defendant
Boarding School Review, LLC (“BSR” or “Plaintiff”) operates an
internet website called Community College Review (the
“website”), accessible at http://www.communitycollegereview.com,
which provides information on community colleges to prospective
students. (Counterclaims ¶ 39.) BSR’s website earns revenue by
the sale of advertising on its website and, Defendants allege,
Internet leads. (Id. ¶ 49.) The website contains subdomains of
hundreds of schools, each of which contains information about
the subject school. Each subdomain or profile contains a brief
overview of the school, data and statistics comparing the school
to community college averages, a map of the school’s location,
and a lead form 2 to acquire admissions information. (Am. Compl.
Ex. A 3 at 6-19; Def. Req. Judicial Notice Exs. C-D.)

However, the Court fails to see the relevance of the Google
support page. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of
the four other webpages and the printouts of those webpages.
(See Req. Judicial Notice Exs. A-D.)
2

A lead form prompts site users to enter their contact
information. Lead generation is a common form of Internet
marketing.
3

Exhibits A and B of the Amended Complaint are incorporated by
reference in the Counterclaims and may be considered by the
Court. See Counterclaims ¶¶ 56, 61 (referencing Defendants’
demand letters regarding trademarks and copyright material).
3
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Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs Delta Career Education
Corporation (“Delta”) 4 and Weston Educational, Inc. (“Heritage”)
(collectively “Defendants”) operate postsecondary schools in
various fields. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 29.) Delta operates over thirtyseven campuses providing associate degree and diploma programs
(the “Delta Schools”). (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Delta provides its
educational goods and services under a number of registered
trademarks (the “Delta Marks”). 5 Heritage operates eight campuses
offering associate degree and diploma programs in the healthcare
field (the “Heritage Schools”). (Id. ¶ 29.) Heritage also
provides its educational goods and services under a number of
registered trademarks (the “Heritage Marks”). 6 The Delta and

4

Also party to this action are Delta’s wholly-owned
subsidiaries: Berks Technical Institute, Inc., Career Training
Specialists, Inc., McCann Education Centers, Inc., Miller-Motte
Business Colleges, Inc., Southwest Business Colleges, Inc., and
the Miami-Jacobs Business College Co. (collectively “Delta”).
(Counterclaims ¶ 15.)
5

The Delta Marks include Academy of Court Reporting, Academy of
Court Reporting Technology, ACRT, Berks Technical Institute,
BTI, Miller-Motte, Miller-Motte College, Miller-Motte Technical
College, Tucson College, Institute for Business and Technology,
IBT, McCann School of Business and Technology, Lamson College,
Lamson Institute, Miami-Jacobs Career College, National Career
Education, and NCE. (Counterclaims ¶ 17.)
6

The Heritage Marks include Heritage Institute, Heritage
College, and Heritage Education. (Counterclaims ¶ 30.)
4
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Heritage schools are profiled on BSR’s website. (Id. ¶¶ 41-45;
Def. Opp. at 3-4.)
In April 2010 and November 2011, counsel to Delta sent a
series of cease and desist letters (the “Letters”) to BSR.
(Counterclaims ¶¶ 56, 61.) In its Letters, Delta claimed that
various trademarks owned or claimed by Delta and used in
connection with its schools were being infringed on BSR’s
website. (Am. Compl. Exs. A-B.) Delta claimed BSR’s website was
a landing page using Delta’s marks and logos to generate
Internet leads for potential students. (Am. Compl. Ex. A at 1.)
Delta further claimed BSR made unauthorized use of Delta’s
YouTube videos, included incorrect information about Delta’s
schools, and copied descriptions of Delta’s schools from their
websites. (Am. Compl. Exs. A-B.) Delta contended that these
actions and others constitute trademark infringement, dilution,
and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, common law
infringement and unfair competition under state law, and false
or deceptive trade practices. (Am. Compl. Exs. A-B.) Delta
demanded that BSR cease any unauthorized uses of its marks
including “all advertising and promotional efforts” such as
“keywords, adwords or domain names that make any reference to
the Delta Marks,” and cease infringing on its copyrighted
material. (Am. Compl. Ex. A at 2.)
5
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Following receipt of the April 2010 letter, BSR indicated
that it would remove some of its infringing use of Delta’s Marks
and copyrighted materials. (Counterclaims ¶ 57.) BSR refused,
however, to remove all of Delta’s Marks and copyrighted
materials, claiming it had a right to make use of such materials
without Delta’s consent. (Id.) In 2011, BSR failed to cease its
infringing use of the Delta Marks. (Id. ¶ 58.) Around this time,
Delta learned that after prospective customers were led to the
website, BSR, through an affiliate entity, collected information
under the guise of sending the information to Delta or a Delta
school, and instead sent the information to Delta’s direct
competitors. (Id. ¶ 60.)
Meanwhile, in November 2011, Heritage learned that BSR was
using the Heritage Marks and copyrighted materials on BSR’s
website in an identically infringing manner. (Counterclaims ¶
63.) Consequently, Heritage, represented by the same counsel as
Delta, allege similar counterclaims against BSR. (Id. ¶¶ 63-70.)
In December 2011, BSR filed the above-captioned action
seeking a declaratory judgment, inter alia, that (1) BSR’s use
of Defendants’ Marks does not violate Defendants’ trademark
rights, (2) BSR’s use of various works in which copyright is
alleged to be owned by Defendants does not infringe on any

6
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copyright held by Defendants; and (3) BSR’s conduct does not
constitute false or misleading advertising.
On July 5, 2012, Defendants counterclaimed seeking relief
for trademark infringement, unfair competition, deceptive trade
practices, trademark dilution, and copyright infringement.
Subsequently, BSR moved this Court to dismiss Defendants’
counterclaims for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
II.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard for a Motion to Dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6)
For a complaint to survive a motion brought pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), the Plaintiff must have pleaded “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has
facial plausibility,” the Supreme Court has explained,
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a
“probability requirement,” but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are
“merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it
“stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556–57). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the
7

Case 1:11-cv-08921-DAB Document 22

Filed 03/29/13 Page 8 of 30

grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “In keeping with these principles,”
the Supreme Court stated,
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose
to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they
are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to
the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must
accept as true all factual allegations set forth in the
Complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
Plaintiff. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508
n.1 (2002); Blue Tree Hotels Inv. (Canada) Ltd. v. Starwood
Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir.
2004). However, this principle is “inapplicable to legal
conclusions,” Iqbal, 556 U .S. at 678, which, like the
Complaint's “labels and conclusions,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,
are disregarded. Nor should a court “accept [as] true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. at 555.

8
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“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider
the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the
complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference
in the complaint.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104,
111 (2d Cir. 2010). Additionally, “[w]here a document is not
incorporated by reference, the court may never[the]less consider
it where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect,
thereby rendering the document integral to the complaint.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, though such
evidence may be considered when attached to or incorporated into
the Complaint, the Court's function is “not to weigh the
evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely to
determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient.”
Holloway v. King, 161 F. App’x 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

B. Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs’ Federal Trademark
Infringement and Unfair Competition Claims
“To prevail on a trademark infringement and unfair
competition claim under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a), in
addition to demonstrating that the plaintiff's mark is
protected, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's use of
9
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the allegedly infringing mark would likely cause confusion as to
the origin or sponsorship of the defendant's goods with
plaintiff's goods.” Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee,
Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir. 2009). “In determining whether
there is a likelihood of confusion,” the Court must “apply the
eight-factor balancing test introduced in Polaroid Corp. v.
Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).” The eight
factors are:
(1) strength of the trademark; (2) similarity of the
marks; (3) proximity of the products and their
competitiveness with one another; (4) evidence that
the senior user may “bridge the gap” by developing a
product for sale in the market of the alleged
infringer's product; (5) evidence of actual consumer
confusion; (6) evidence that the imitative mark was
adopted in bad faith; (7) respective quality of the
products; and (8) sophistication of consumers in the
relevant market.
Id. at 115. This balancing test “is not mechanical, but rather
focuse[d] on the ultimate question of whether, looking at the
products in their totality, consumers are likely to be
confused.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Orient Express Trading Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 842
F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[C]ourts are not required to
slavishly recite the litany of all eight factors . . . [,] but
need only consider sufficient factors to reach the ultimate
conclusion as to whether or not there is a likelihood of
confusion.”)
10
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Because the entitlement of Defendants’ Marks to protection
under §§ 1114(1) and 1125(a) of the Lanham Act is not in
dispute, the Court turns to whether there is a likelihood of
confusion. The Court first considers the trademark claim related
to the following statements appearing on BSR’s website: “Get
info / application from Miami-Jacobs Career College”; “Get info
/ application from Miller-Motte Technical College”; “Get info /
application from Miller-Motte College–Cary”; “Get info /
application from Heritage College–Oklahoma City.” (Am. Compl.
Ex. A at 10, 16; Def. Req. Judicial Notice Ex. C at 4; Def. Req.
Judicial Notice Ex. D at 4.) Defendants, without referring to
these particular trademark uses, allege that BSR “collects
information under the guise of sending the information to Delta
and/or a Delta School, and instead, sends the information to
schools BSR knows to be in direct competition with Delta and/or
Delta Schools.” (Counterclaims ¶ 60.) Defendants further allege
that at BSR’s website, “when a user searches for information
about HERITAGE College, users were prompted to obtain admissions
information through a computer prompt, which solicited user
information.” (Counterclaims ¶ 64.) Defendants then allege that
“BSR obtains revenue from its sister company who lead [sic]
Internet users away from Heritage to the services of schools it
knows to be in competition with Heritage.” (Counterclaims ¶ 65.)
11

Case 1:11-cv-08921-DAB Document 22

Filed 03/29/13 Page 12 of 30

It is possible that users who clicked on the links labeled
“Get info / application from” Defendants’ schools were brought
to an educational competitor’s website, or were prompted to
enter user information that was sent to an educational
competitor. Were this the case, a likelihood of confusion might
result from the “Get info / application from” links. See
FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d
545, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (suggesting that a trademark violation
might result if Defendant “substitut[ed] its website in response
to a request for plaintiff's website.”). However, the facts
alleged in the Counterclaims are “merely consistent with” the
theory that the “Get info / application from” links brought
users to Defendants’ competitors; they make the theory no more
than a “sheer possibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The
Counterclaims therefore “stop short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants’ Counterclaims regarding all other uses of their
Marks on BSR’s website fail under the Polaroid test. The
likelihood that actual or potential consumers would be confused
about the source of BSR’s subdomain pages profiling Defendants’
schools is remote. The stylized title “Community College Review”
is featured prominently at the top of BSR’s domain and subdomain
12
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pages. (Def. Req. Judicial Notice Ex. C at 1; Def. Req. Judicial
Notice Ex. D at 1.) Directly below that title is a navigation
menu directing site visitors to “Find Schools,” “Compare
Colleges,” or to read “Articles.” (Id.) This header and
navigational menu clearly and quickly communicate to site
visitors that BSR’s website is an omnibus review site profiling
community colleges, not a website affiliated with or sponsored
by the schools profiled. Moreover, consumers who desire to earn
post-secondary degrees or prepare for careers in the healthcare
field are likely sophisticated internet users familiar with the
distinction between an official school page and a omnibus review
site. (Counterclaims ¶¶ 22, 32.) In addition, Parties operate in
distinct industries. Defendants operate a large number of
educational institutions whereas BSR operates a review site
profiling community colleges. While both Parties attempt to
generate leads for prospective students, this hardly renders
their services proximate to one another. Defendants offer
prospective clients an education; BSR offers site visitors,
inter alia, assistance with the educational decision-making
process. It is unlikely that Defendants will bridge the gap by
developing their own community college review site. Accordingly,
the Court finds that Defendants have failed to allege plausibly
a likelihood of confusion.
13
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Because Defendants have failed to allege sufficient facts
to raise their entitlement to relief above the speculative
level, BSR’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ trademark
infringement claims is hereby GRANTED.

C. Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs’ Common Law Unfair
Competition Claims
“The elements necessary to prevail on common law causes of
action for . . . unfair competition mirror Lanham Act claims.”
Information Superhighway, Inc. v. Talk Am., Inc., 395 F. Supp.
2d 44, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). “In addition, to succeed on the
merits of a common law claim of unfair competition, a plaintiff
must couple its evidence supporting liability under the Lanham
Act with additional evidence demonstrating the defendant's bad
faith.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see
also Gameologist Group, LLC v. Scientific Games Int’l, Inc., 838
F. Supp. 2d 141, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Under New York law,
‘[t]he essence of unfair competition . . . is the bad faith
misappropriation of the labors and expenditures of another,
likely to cause confusion or to deceive purchasers as to the
origin of the goods.’”) (quoting Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v.
Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995)).

14
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The Court must dismiss Defendants’ claims for common law
unfair competition for the same reason it dismisses their Lanham
Act claims: Defendants have failed to allege plausibly that
BSR’s use of their Marks creates a likelihood of confusion.

D. Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Deceptive Trade Practices
Claim Under N.Y. General Business Law § 349
“To state a claim under § 349 a plaintiff must allege that
‘(1) the defendant's deceptive acts were directed at consumers,
(2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the
plaintiff has been injured as a result.’” Eliya, Inc. v. Kohl's
Dep’t Stores, No. 06 Civ. 195 (GEL), 2006 WL 2645196, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2006) (quoting Maurizio v. Goldsmith, 230
F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2000)). “However, § 349 ‘is, at its core,
a consumer protection device,’ Securitron Magnalock Corp. v.
Schnabolk, 65 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 1995), not a tool to
resolve disputes between competitors.” Id. “Courts in this
district have repeatedly rejected attempts to use section 349
where the Complaint essentially alleges harm to a corporate
competitor, not the public at large.” LBB Corp. v. Lucas
Distribution, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 4320 (SAS), 2008 WL 2743751, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2008). “[F]or the statute to apply, a
plaintiff must establish a ‘direct harm to consumers’ that is
15
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greater than the ‘general consumer confusion’ commonly found in
trademark actions.” Eliya, Inc., 2006 WL 2645196, at *7. “The
‘gravamen’ of the claim must be an alleged injury to consumers
or the general public.” Id. (citing Schnabolk, 65 F.3d at 264).
“[C]ourts have interpreted the statute's scope as limited to the
types of offenses to the public interest that would trigger
Federal Trade Commission intervention under 15 U.S.C. § 45, such
as potential danger to the public health or safety.” DO Denim,
LLC v. Fried Denim, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 403, 409 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The conduct need not
be repetitive or recurring but defendants' acts or practices
must have a broad impact on consumers at large.” LBB Corp., 2008
WL 2743751, at *2 (quoting N.Y. Univ. v. Continental Ins. Co.,
87 N.Y.2d 308, 320 (1995)). “Where the only alleged harm is that
which is generally associated with violations of intellectual
property law, courts in this district have found that plaintiffs
cannot state a claim under § 349.” Eliya, Inc., 2006 WL 2645196,
at *8.
Nothing in Defendants’ Counterclaims approaches a plausible
allegation of the type of direct and broad harm to consumers or
the general public that would trigger Federal Trade Commission
intervention. Instead, the Counterclaims essentially allege harm

16
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to Defendants rather than the public at large. Accordingly,
Defendants’ § 349 claim is DISMISSED.

E. Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs’ Federal Trademark
Dilution Claims
To prevail on a federal trademark dilution claim, a
plaintiff must prove that (1) its mark is famous and
distinctive, (2) its mark is used in commerce by the defendant,
and (3) the defendant’s use is likely to cause dilution through
either “blurring” or “tarnishment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). A
mark is famous if it is “widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States” as a designation
indicating a single source of goods or services. Id. §
1125(c)(2)(A). The Lanham Act identifies a non-exhaustive set of
factors courts may consider when determining whether a mark
possesses the requisite degree of recognition:
(1) the duration, extent, and geographic reach of
advertising
and
publicity
of
the
mark,
whether
advertised or publicized by the owner or third
parties; (2) the amount, volume, and geographic extent
of sales of goods or services offered under the mark;
(3) the extent of actual recognition of the mark; (4)
whether the mark was registered under the Act of March
3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905 or on the
principal register.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv).

17
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Courts applying these criteria have generally limited
famous marks to those that are “almost universally recognized by
the general public.” Heller Inc. v. Design Within Reach, Inc.,
No. 09 Civ. 1909 (JGK), 2009 WL 2486054, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
14, 2009). The Second Circuit, for example, has explained that
marks such as Dupont, Buick, and Kodak exemplify famous marks
entitled to anti-dilution protection. TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar
Commc’ns., Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). Similarly,
district courts within the Second Circuit have explained that §
1125(c) “limits federal dilution claims to truly famous marks
like Budweiser beer, Camel cigarettes, Barbie Dolls, and the
like.” Luv N’ Care Ltd. v. Regent Baby Prods. Corp., 841 F.
Supp. 2d 753, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Moreover, “[t]he degree of
fame required for protection under § 1125(c) must exist in the
general marketplace, not in a niche market.” Kuklachev v.
Gelfman, 600 F. Supp. 2d 437, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)(dismissing
dilution claim on a 12(b)(6) motion because plaintiff’s mark was
not “truly famous”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Luv N’ Care Ltd., 841 F. Supp. 2d at 757 (dismissing dilution
claim on a 12(b)(6) motion because plaintiff’s marks were only
famous within a niche, not among the general consuming public);
Heller Inc., 2009 WL 2486054, at *4 (same).

18
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The Court finds that Defendants have failed to plead
sufficient facts making it plausible that their Marks are famous
and thereby entitled to anti-dilution protection under §
1125(c). Defendants’ general allegations that their Marks have
“fostered wide renown [sic] with the trade and public” and have
“great value and secondary meaning among the consuming public”
(see Counterclaims ¶¶ 22, 28, 32) are labels and conclusions not
entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Defendants’ other allegations, at best, make it plausible that
their Marks are recognized within the niche market of forprofit, post-secondary schools. Allegations that Defendants own
at least fourteen educational institutions, provide educational
services to at least 16,000 people, have one subsidiary that has
operated for more than 100 years, have invested “enormous” sums
of money in marketing, provide services that are “highly sought
after,” and have experienced “extraordinary and longstanding
sales success” do not make it plausible that Defendants’ Marks
are truly famous to the general consuming public of the United
States. (Counterclaims ¶¶ 17, 18, 21, 22, 29, 31, 32.)
Accordingly, BSR’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Defendants’
federal trademark dilution claims is hereby GRANTED.

19
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F. Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Claims for Injury to
Business Reputation and Dilution under N.Y. General
Business Law § 360–l
New York General Business Law § 360-l provides that
“[l]ikelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of
the distinctive quality of a mark or trade name shall be a
ground for injunctive relief . . . notwithstanding the absence
of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion
as to the source of goods or services.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §
360-l. “Unlike federal trademark dilution law . . . , New York's
trademark dilution law does not require a mark to be ‘famous’
for protection against dilution to apply.” Starbucks Corp. v.
Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir. 2009).
State law, unlike federal law, “requires a showing of a mere
likelihood of dilution.” Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney &
Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). In addition, “New York
law does not permit a dilution claim unless the marks are
‘substantially’ similar.” Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d at 114.
“Similar to federal trademark dilution law under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c), section 360-l has been interpreted to provide for
protection against both dilution by blurring and tarnishment.”
Id. “‘[D]ilution by blurring may occur where the defendant uses
20
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or modifies the plaintiff's trademark to identify the
defendant's goods and services, raising the possibility that the
mark will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of
the plaintiff's product.” Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson
Productions, Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Therefore, blurring does not occur where a defendant’s use of a
plaintiff’s mark “tends to increase public identification of a
plaintiff's mark with the plaintiff.” Tommy Hilfiger Licensing,
Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 422 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); see also Hormel Foods Corp., 73 F.3d at 506 (finding no
blurring where the parody "tend[ed] to increase public
identification" of the mark with the senior mark holder); N.Y.
Stock Exch., Inc. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 479,
490 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (rejecting blurring claim because "the
challenged marks explicitly refer to the [senior user], and
their success depends on a customer making a connection with the
original marks"), aff'd in part, rev'd on other grounds, 293
F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2002).
Here, Defendants have failed to allege plausibly that BSR’s
use of Defendants’ Marks raises the possibility that the Marks
will lose their ability to serve as a unique identifier of
Defendants’ educational institutions. BSR’s website catalogues,
21
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describes, and compares community colleges. (Def. Opp. Exs. CD.) Its use of Defendants’ Marks “causes no loss of
distinctiveness, since the success of the use depends upon the
continued association of the mark with” Defendants’ educational
institutions. Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d at
422; see also N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d at 490.
Indeed, BSR’s website tends to increase public identification of
Defendants’ Marks with the educational institutions they
represent, by describing the educational institutions in detail.
(Def. Opp. Exs. C-D.) This is the very opposite of blurring.
“Tarnishment occurs where a trademark is ‘linked to
products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or
unsavory context,’ with the result that ‘the public will
associate the lack of quality or lack of prestige in the
defendant's goods with the plaintiff's unrelated goods.’” N.Y.
Stock Exchange, Inc. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 558
(2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 43). Although
“tarnishment is not limited to seamy conduct,” id. at 558
(internal quotation marks omitted), courts are “careful not to
broaden section [160-l] to prohibit all uses of a distinctive
mark that the owner prefers not be made.” Deere & Co., 41 F.3d
at 44. Here, Defendants have failed to allege plausibly that BSR
has linked Defendants’ Marks to products of shoddy quality or
22
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are portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Counterclaims pursuant to N.Y. General
Business Law § 360-1 are DISMISSED.

G. Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Copyright Infringement
Claims
“In order to demonstrate copyright infringement, a
plaintiff must show ownership of a valid copyright and copying
of the protectable elements of the copyrighted work.” Scholz
Design, Inc. v. Sard Custom Homes, LLC, 691 F.3d 182, 186 (2d
Cir. 2012). “[T]he Copyright Act grants the copyright holder
‘exclusive’ rights to use and to authorize the use of his work”
in the specific ways enumerated in the statute, “including
reproduction of the copyrighted work in copies.” Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432-33
(1984). “To prove infringement, a plaintiff must show that: (1)
the defendant actually copied the plaintiff's work; and (2) the
copying is illegal because a ‘substantial similarity’ exists
between the defendant's work and the protectible elements of the
plaintiff's work.” Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159
F.3d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1998).
BSR argues that Defendants contractually waived their right
to sue for copyright infringement of the videos Series 2 TV
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Case 1:11-cv-08921-DAB Document 22

Filed 03/29/13 Page 24 of 30

Spot: 2 For 1 and Heritage Graduate Chris S. when it placed
those videos on YouTube. (Pl. Mem. in Supp. 23-24.) 7 In support
of this claim, BSR cites to YouTube’s Terms of Service. The
YouTube Terms of Service, however, were not alleged in, attached
to, or incorporated by reference in the Counterclaims; nor do
the Counterclaims rely heavily upon their terms and effect. The
Court also declines to take judicial notice of the YouTube Terms
of Service. Although the Court generally has the discretion to
take judicial notice of internet material, see Magnoni v. Smith
& Laquercia, LLP, 701 F. Supp. 2d 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), BSR
offers nothing to authenticate the online contract as the
contract governing Defendants’ relationship with YouTube.
Accordingly, the Court cannot and does not find at this stage in
the proceedings that Defendants waived their right to sue for
copyright infringement of the videos they placed on YouTube. See
Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (“The court may judicially notice a fact
that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can
be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.”).
7

In BSR’s Reply brief, it makes new claims regarding whether the
works are entitled to copyright protection and whether BSR
copied the works in their entirety. (Reply Mem. 8.) However, the
Court need not consider claims first raised in a reply brief,
see Cantor Fitzgerald Inc. v. Lutnick, 313 F.3d 704, 710 n.3 (2d
Cir. 2002), and declines to do so here.
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Under the Copyright Act, “the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies . . . for
purposes such as criticism, comment . . . or research, is not an
infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. “Whether such ‘fair
use’ exists involves a case-by-case determination using four
non-exclusive, statutorily provided factors in light of the
purposes of copyright.” Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2006). These factors
are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107. “At bottom, however, whether a particular use
of a copyrighted work constitutes fair use depends on ‘whether
the copyright law's goal of promoting the Progress of Science
and useful Arts would be better served by allowing the use than
by preventing it.’” Swatch Group Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg
L.P., 808 F. Supp. 2d 634, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Bill
Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 608).
The Court cannot address the fact-intensive issue of fair
use after reviewing only the pleadings. Accordingly, the Court
declines to determine whether BSR’s use of Defendants’
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copyrighted works was a fair use before the Parties have
completed discovery. See, e.g., Swatch Group Mgmt. Servs., 808
F. Supp. 2d at 641 (declining to address the issue of fair use
before Parties had opportunity for discovery); Browne v. McCain,
611 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[I]n light of a court's
narrow inquiry at this stage and limited access to all
potentially relevant and material facts needed to undertake the
analysis, courts rarely analyze fair use on a 12(b)(6) motion.”)
“Under 17 U.S.C. § 412, a plaintiff may not recover
statutory damages or attorney's fees for any infringement
‘commenced’ before the effective date of a copyright's
registration.” Troll Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co., 483 F.3d 150, 158
(2d Cir. 2007). “The courts have held, based on the provision's
text, legislative history, and purpose, that a plaintiff may not
recover statutory damages and attorney's fees for infringement
occurring after registration if that infringement is part of an
ongoing series of infringing acts and the first act occurred
before registration.” Id.; see also Inst. for Dev. of Earth
Awareness v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, No. 08
Civ. 6195 (PKC), 2009 WL 2850230, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009)
(same).
Here, Defendants may not recover statutory damages or
attorney’s fees because all alleged copyright infringement
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commenced before the effective dates of the relevant copyright
registrations. The effective dates of all specific copyright
registrations alleged by Defendants are on or after May 17, 2012
(Counterclaims ¶¶ 25-26, 35-36; Counterclaims Exs. 2, 3, 5.) The
alleged copyright infringement regarding the MMTC website
commenced, at the latest, in April 2010. (Am. Compl. Ex. A.) The
alleged copyright infringement regarding the Series 2 TV Spot: 2
for 1, the Heritage website, and Heritage Graduate Chris S.
commenced, at the latest, in November 2011. (Am. Compl. Ex. B;
Counterclaims ¶¶ 37, 63.)
Defendants, in their Opposition brief, attempt to assert a
claim for statutory damages and attorney’s fees for “any works
that were registered before the infringement was discovered.”
(Def. Opp. 16.) They argue that the pleadings “raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal” that BSR
infringed copyrighted works other than the four works
specifically referenced in the Counterclaims. (Id. 17.) However,
Defendants have failed to plead facts that allow the Court to
draw the reasonable inference that BSR’s infringement commenced
after the effective date of a copyright’s registration. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. They plead that their copyrighted
material “includes, but is not limited to,” four particular
works which Defendants have registered with the U.S. Copyright
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Office. (Counterclaims ¶¶ 25-27, 35-37.) Merely stating that
Defendants’ copyrighted material “is not limited to” these four
works does not constitute factual content making it plausible
that BSR infringed additional copyrighted works. Accordingly,
the Court DISMISSES Defendants’ counterclaims for statutory
damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to the Copyright Act.
However, the Court DENIES BSR’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants’
counterclaims seeking relief other than statutory damages and
attorney’s fees pursuant to the Copyright Act.

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, BSR’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendants’ Counterclaims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
is GRANTED as to Defendants’ counterclaims for trademark
infringement, unfair competition, deceptive trade practices, and
trademark dilution, as well as to Defendants’ copyright
infringement counterclaims for statutory damages and attorney’s
fees. BSR’s Motion is DENIED as to Defendants’ remaining
copyright infringement counterclaims.
When a complaint has been dismissed, permission to amend it
shall be freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). However, a court may dismiss without leave to amend
when amendment would be futile, or would not survive a motion to
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dismiss. Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. City of Sherrill,
337 F.3d 139, 168 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 544
U.S. 197 (2005). “Where the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate
that he would be able to amend his complaint in a manner which
would survive dismissal, opportunity to replead is rightfully
denied.” Beachum v. AWISCO New York Corp., 459 F. App’x 58, 59
(2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42,
53 (2d Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court GRANTS Defendants leave to amend their federal
and state trademark infringement, federal and state unfair
competition, and state trademark dilution counterclaims
regarding the “Get info / application from” hyperlinks featured
on the printouts of BSR’s webpages. (See Am. Compl. Ex. A at 10,
16; Am. Compl. Ex. C at 12; Def. Req. Judicial Notice Ex. C at
4; Def. Req. Judicial Notice Ex. D at 4.) All other trademark
infringement, unfair competition, deceptive trade practices, and
trademark dilution claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, as are
Defendants’ copyright infringement claims for statutory damages
and attorney’s fees. Amendment of these claims would be futile
or would not survive a motion to dismiss.
Any amended counterclaims shall be filed within forty-five
days of the date of this Order. Failure to do so shall result in
dismissal with prejudice of all claims except for the Copyright
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Act counterclaims for relief other than statutory damages and
attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.
DATED:

March 29, 2013
New York, New York
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